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SURVEY
DEVELOPMENTS IN DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA CASE LAW
I. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A. Park Police Jurisdiction
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently decided a case of first
impression concerning park police jurisdiction.' In Richardson v. United
States,2 United States Park Police officers arrested the appellant for posses-
sion of a controlled substance.3 The appellant contested jurisdiction because
neither the alleged illegal activity nor the arrest occurred in the vicinity of a
park.4 The trial court denied the appellant's motion to suppress evidence
that park police seized in a search.'
On appeal, the court examined the statutes and legislative history of the
laws creating park police jurisdiction and concluded that Congress intended
to confer concurrent jurisdiction to park police and metropolitan police.6
1. Although the United States District Court for the District of Columbia ruled that the
park police have jurisdiction throughout the District of Columbia, United States v. Alatishe,
616 F. Supp. 1406, 1410 (D.D.C. 1985), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals first ad-
dressed the issue in Richardson v. United States, 520 A.2d 692, 694 (D.C.), cert. denied, 108 S.
Ct. 267 (1987).
2. 520 A.2d 692 (D.C. 1987).
3. Id. at 693. Police charged the appellant with possession of dilaudid, in violation of
§ 33-541(d) of the District of Columbia Code. Id.; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 33-541(d)
(Supp. 1987).
4. Richardson, 520 A.2d at 693.
5. Id. at 693-94. The park police seized a pill box containing dilaudid. Id. at 693.
6. Id. at 694-96. The court first examined an early statute that did not explicitly extend
park police jurisdiction beyond "public squares and reservations in the District of Columbia."
Act of Aug. 5, 1882, ch. 389, 22 Stat. 219, 243 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. § 4-
201 (1981 & Supp. 1987)). However, a later enactment, which created authority for "special
policemen," limited the jurisdiction of the "special policemen" to parks, but did not explicitly
limit the jurisdiction of the regular park police. Act of May 27, 1924, ch. 199, §§ 4, 9, 43 Stat.
174, 175-76 (codified as amended at D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 4-201-205 (1981 & Supp. 1987)).
Because of Congress' failure to limit park police jurisdiction, the court interpreted such inac-
tion as giving park police concurrent jurisdiction with the metropolitan police. Richardson,
520 A.2d at 695-96. The court also considered that Congress had notice that the Department
of the Interior, the federal agency to which the United States Park Police belong, took the
position that park police officers had city-wide jurisdiction. Id. at 695.
Catholic University Law Review
Thus, the court held that United States Park Police jurisdiction to arrest
extends beyond federal parks or reservations and encompasses all areas of
the District of Columbia.7
B. Searches and Seizures
The fourth amendment was the subject of a significant case that the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals recently decided. In Smith v. United
States,' the court loosely applied the articulable suspicion requirement of
Terry v. Ohio.9 In accord with their suspicion, the police observed the appel-
lant talking to two persons who sold drugs to an undercover agent only min-
utes before.' ° When uniformed police officers approached the three, the
appellant quickly walked away." An officer followed the appellant, identi-
fied himself as a police officer, and asked the appellant to stop.' 2 The appel-
lant replied that he had nothing to do with the others and continued to walk
away.' 3 When the police officer placed his hand on the appellant's shoulder,
the appellant reacted violently. 4 The ensuing scuffle resulted in the discov-
ery of a pistol in the appellant's vest pocket and the arrest of the appellant
for carrying a pistol without a license.'" At trial the appellant moved to
suppress the evidence, characterizing as unlawful the stop and the subse-
quent seizure.' 6 The appellant argued that the circumstances did not pro-
vide a sufficient basis for a stop.' 7 The trial court denied the appellant's
motion to suppress.' 8
On appeal, the appellant reasserted his argument that the circumstances
did not warrant a Terry stop.' 9 With little discussion, the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals found that the officer's observations and experience
provided sufficient articulable suspicion to justify the stop.20 The court cited
7. Richardson, 520 A.2d at 693. However, in United States v. Edelen, 529 A.2d 774
(D.C. 1987), the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the District of Columbia
Superior Court does not have authority pursuant to district law to issue search warrants to
park police. Id. at 775.
8. 525 A.2d 200 (D.C. 1987).
9. Id. at 201-02; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
10. Smith, 525 A.2d at 201.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. The appellant "swung his hand at [the police officer's] face." Id.
15. Id. The .22 caliber pistol was loaded. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. Furthermore, the appellant argued that sufficient evidence to uphold a conviction
did not exist. Id.
18. Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)).
19. Id.
20. Id.
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United States v. Bennett,21 where it previously held that the court must look
to the totality of police observations when determining whether a basis for a
22stop exists. Applying Bennett to the instant case, the court found that the
"totality of circumstances" provided sufficient articulable suspicion to stop
the appellant.23 The circumstances the court emphasized were the appel-
lant's conversation with two men suspected of a recent drug sale to an un-
dercover officer, the absence of any other persons in the area of the suspects,
the police officer's knowledge that drug sales are often made by teams, and
the high incidence of drug trafficking in the area.24 The court also consid-
ered the appellant's attempt to leave, stating that it implied a "consciousness
of guilt" that "weighs significantly in justifying the Fourth Amendment
seizure. '
2
-
In a dissenting opinion, Judge Newman argued that the "articulable suspi-
cion" in this case amounted to the police officer's observation of the appel-
lant talking to individuals who fit the description of persons who had sold
drugs to an undercover officer.26 He maintained that guilt by association
should have no "foothold in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. 27
Judge Newman cited two cases, Sibron v. New York 2 and Ybarra v. Illi-
-nois,29 which ruled that conversing with or being near other criminal sus-
pects does not, in itself, provide probable cause to search a person.3° Judge
Newman also disagreed with the majority's heavy reliance on the "con-
sciousness of guilt" factor.31 He argued that a person may have a legitimate
21. 514 A.2d 414 (D.C. 1986).
22. Smith v. United States, 525 A.2d 200, 201 (D.C. 1987) (citing United States v. Ben-
nett, 514 A.2d 414, 416 (D.C. 1986)).
23. Id. at 201-02.
24. Id. at 201.
25. Id. at 202. The court concluded, however, that "the matter is close." Id.
26. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting). He called the other facts cited by the majority "make-
weight" factors. Id. (Newman, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 202 (Newman, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 202-03 (Newman, J., dissenting) (referring to Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40
(1968)). Sibron was the companion case to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
29. Smith, 525 A.2d at 203 (Newman, J., dissenting) (referring to Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85 (1979)).
30. Id. at 202-03 (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62
(1968); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979)). The dissenting opinion in Smith noted that
the officer had not seen the appellant and the other suspects pass any money or make any
suspicious gestures. Thus, the arresting officer's asserted suspicion that the appellant consti-
tuted part of a distribution team proved inadequate because anyone in the proximity of the
other suspects could have evoked the same suspicion. Id. at 204-05 (Newman, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 205-06 (Newman, J., dissenting). On several occasions the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals emphasized attempted flight to find "consciousness of guilt" and reasonable
suspicion. See United States v. Johnson, 496 A.2d 592, 595-97 (D.C. 1985); United States v.
McCarthy, 448 A.2d 267, 270 (D.C. 1982); Franklin v. United States, 382 A.2d 20, 22 (D.C.
1988]
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desire to avoid police contact and that an innocent fear of such contact can
motivate flight.32 He further noted that the trial judge found that the gov-
ernment had not sufficiently shown that the appellant even knew that the
person who asked him to stop was a police officer, enhancing his argument
that the attempted flight by the appellant did not indicate consciousness of
guilt.33
C. Missing Witness Argument
In another case, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently clari-
fied the permissible use of the "missing witness" argument.34 In Arnold v.
United States," the court convicted the appellant of armed robbery of three
patrons of a Connecticut Avenue drinking establishment.3 6 The appellant's
girlfriend and her sister testified at trial that the appellant was present at a
1978); Tobias v. United States, 375 A.2d 491, 494 (D.C. 1977); Stephenson v. United States,
296 A.2d 606, 610 (D.C. 1972); Smith v. United States, 295 A.2d 64, 66 (D.C. 1972). How-
ever, in each case, other significant suspicious circumstances, or some other overt act by the
suspect helped justify a stop or seizure. For example, in United States v. Bennett, 514 A.2d
414 (D.C. 1986), upon which the Smith court relied in part for its decision, the court found a
reasonable basis for a stop because, in addition to the suspect's flight, police had seen him
exchange money and stick his hand into his waistband. Id. at 414-15; see also Johnson, 496
A.2d at 594 (damaged car at late hour in high crime area); McCarthy, 448 A.2d at 268, 270
(suspicious handling of contents in auto ashtray and littering); Franklin, 382 A.2d at 22 (suspi-
cious use of automobile); Tobias, 375 A.2d at 494 (exchanges of money for small objects);
Stephenson, 296 A.2d at 610 (presence and suspicious activity in a normally deserted area in
early morning); Smith, 295 A.2d at 65-66 (suspects searching automobiles).
32. Smith, 525 A.2d at 205-06 (Newman, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 206 (Newman, J., dissenting). Judge Newman also argued that in cases where
the court found "consciousness of guilt," the suspects ran from the scene when police arrived.
Id. (Newman, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Bennett, 514 A.2d 414, 414 (D.C. 1986);
Tobias v. United States, 375 A.2d 491, 492 (D.C. 1977); Lawrence v. United States, 509 A.2d
614, 615 (D.C. 1968)).
34. The prosecution makes a missing witness argument when, in its closing statement, it
argues that the defendant failed to produce a witness who could verify the defendant's testi-
mony or alibi. The prosecutor attempts to draw an inference that the reason the defendant has
not produced a witness is either because no witness exists or, if a witness is available, he would
produce testimony unfavorable to the defendant. See Graves v. United States, 150 U.S. 118,
120-21 (1893).
In the District of Columbia, an attorney must obtain the court's permission before making a
missing witness argument. The court, before granting permission, must determine (1) that the
missing witness would be able to clarify the story and (2) that the missing witness is "pecu-
liarly available" to the defendant. Thomas v. United States, 447 A.2d 52, 57-58 (D.C. 1982);
see also Graves, 150 U.S. at 120-21.
35. 511 A.2d 399 (D.C. 1986).
36. Id. at 402. The victims were leaving the bar, located on Connecticut Avenue, N.W.,
when the robbery occurred. Id. Shortly after the robbery, police arrested the appellant near
Fourteenth and Chapin Streets, N.W., in connection with another incident. Id. When police
searched the appellant, they found property from the Connecticut Avenue robbery in his pos-
session. Id
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house party during the time of the robbery.3 7 Without asking permission
from the court, the prosecution, in its closing statement, argued that the
defendant failed to produce witnesses present at the party to verify his al-
ibi.38 According to the prosecution, the girlfriend and her sister had biased
motives to testify on the defendant's behalf.3 9 The trial court sustained the
defense counsel's objection to the prosecution's line of argument but refused
to give a correcting instruction to the jury.' On appeal of his conviction,
the appellant sought reversal of his conviction by characterizing the missing
witness argument as improper and substantially prejudicial to his defense.4"
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals first examined the prosecu-
tor's address to the jury and labelled it an "incomplete" missing witness ar-
gument.4 2 The court called the argument "incomplete" because the
prosecutor simply noted the absence of witnesses and did not directly ask the
jury to draw an inference from the testimony that would prove damaging to
the defendant.43 Next, the court examined conflicting case law on the issue
of whether or not the prosecution must obtain the trial court's permission
prior to making an incomplete missing witness argument." The court re-
37. Id. at 415.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. A second attempt by the prosecution to advance the missing witness argument
resulted in the court cautioning the prosecutor. Id. Thus the court prevented the prosecution
from explicitly asking the jury to draw an inference that either the defendant did not attend the
party and therefore his alibi was false, or, if he did attend the party, the reason the defendant
did not call other witnesses was because their testimony would damage his case, i.e., that the
defendant was not at the party at the time he had testified. Id.
41. Id. at 402.
42. Id. at 415-16.
43. Id. However, if the defense had'not objected, the government might have continued
its argument and directly asked the jury to infer that if the defendant could produce any other
witnesses, their testimony would damage the defendant's case. If the prosecution actually
asked the jury to make such an inference, the trial court would have ruled the prosecution's
actions improper. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals previously ruled that, in this
type situation, the party making the argument must first obtain the court's permission to do so.
Thomas v. United States, 447 A.2d 52, 58 (D.C. 1982).
44. Arnold, 511 A.2d at 416. The court cited several cases decided by the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals where prosecutors advanced "incomplete" missing witness argu-
ments without the trial courts' permission. Logan v. United States, 489 A.2d 485, 490 (D.C.
1985) (no misconduct where the prosecution did not explicitly ask the jury to make an infer-
ence); Parks v. United States, 451 A.2d 591, 614 (D.C. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 945 (1983)
(reference "did not constitute grave misconduct"); Harvey v. United States, 395 A.2d 92, 98
(D.C. 1978) (error, but not reversible error, because the prosecution did not advance a direct
implication), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 936 (1979); Fleming v. United States, 310 A.2d 214, 220
(D.C. 1973) (failure to seek court's permission to make missing witness reference was harmless
error); Conyers v. United States, 309 A.2d 309, 313 (D.C. 1973) (harmless error because of a
curative instruction).
1988]
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solved the conflict by holding that the judge must grant permission before
counsel may make any missing witness argument, whether complete or
not.45 The court reasoned that this rule would help prevent improper infer-
ences and thus avoid prejudicial error.46 Applying the rule to this case, the
court held the argument improper, but found the misconduct harmless be-
cause it lacked such severity as to substantially sway the jury.4 7
D. Sentencing Under Youth Rehabilitation Act
The District of Columbia Superior Court recently considered the legality
of imposing sentences under the Youth Rehabilitation Amendment Act of
1985"a (Youth Act) that are more lengthy than the originally imposed
sentences.49 In United States v. Wheeler, 5o the defendant received concur-
rent one year adult sentences for destruction of property and attempted un-
authorized use of a motor vehicle. 51 The court suspended all but thirty days
of each sentence and placed defendant on six months of supervised proba-
tion.52 Three months later, the prosecutor charged the defendant in a sec-
ond case with two counts of possession of a controlled substance.53 After
the defendant's conviction on those counts, the superior court revoked his
probation on the earlier offenses. The court then sentenced the defendant to
consecutive sentences under the Youth Act-six months for the destruction
of property and twelve months for attempted unauthorized use of a motor
vehicle." 4 The defendant moved to vacate the sentences on the ground that
the judge, by imposing a maximum eighteen month Youth Act sentence,
unlawfully increased the original twelve month concurrent sentences."
The superior court first examined district law governing sentencing after
revocation of probation.56 The law allows the court to impose either the
45. Arnold, 511 A.2d at 416.
46. Id.
47. Id. The court found that the prosecutor's initial statements about the missing witness
were proper "because the law was uncertain." Id. Although the prosecution improperly con-
tinued the argument after the court sustained the defendant's objection, id. at 415, the court
nonetheless decided that the jury "was not substantially swayed by the error." Id. at 416
(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).
48. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 24-801 to -807 (1981 & Supp. 1987) [hereinafter Youth Act].
49. United States v. Wheeler, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. 2025, 2025 (D.C. Super. Ct., Sept.
25, 1987).
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 22-103, 22-403 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
52. Wheeler, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2025.
53. Id. at 2025, 2029.
54. Id. at 2029.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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original sentence or any lesser one.57 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals interpreted this provision to mean that the court could impose any
sentence no more severe than the sentence originally imposed. 8 Thus, the
modified maximum eighteen month Youth Act sentence would be appropri-
ate only if it was punishment "no more severe than the original" twelve
month maximum sentence. 59
Because the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had not ruled on the
specific aspect of the Youth Act at issue in Wheeler, the District of Colum-
bia Superior Court examined Moore v. United States, " where the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals previously ruled on the legality of imposing a
Federal Youth Correction Act (FYCA) 61 sentence longer than the standard
sentence for the same crime. In Moore, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals refused to find a more lengthy sentence under the FYCA "more
severe" because youth offender treatment under FYCA provided less pun-
ishment and more rehabilitation than adult imprisonment. 62 The court rea-
soned, therefore, that the length of the sentence alone does not determine the
sentence's severity.63
The superior court next found that the Youth Act had the same purposes
and effects as the FYCA 64 and therefore the "more severe" standard set
forth by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Moore applied. 65 Fol-
lowing this line of reasoning, the court found defendant's eighteen month
maximum Youth Act sentence no more severe than the twelve month adult
sentence.
66
57. Id.; D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-104 (1981 & Supp. 1987). That section reads, in part: "At
any time during the probationary term ... the court may revoke the order of probation and
cause the rearrest of the probationer and impose a sentence and require him to serve the sen-
tence ... originally imposed ... or any lesser sentence." Id.
58. Mulky v. United States, 451 A.2d 855, 856 (D.C. 1982). The provision interpreted in
Mulky did not include the words "or any lesser sentence." Compare D.C. CODE ANN. § 24-
104 (1981) (court may require probationer to serve the sentence originally imposed) with D.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-104 (1981 & Supp. 1987) (court may require probationer to serve sentence
originally imposed, or any lesser sentence).
59. Wheeler, 115 Wash. Daily L. Rep. at 2029 (citing Mulky v. United States, 456 A.2d
885, 856 (D.C. 1982)).
60. Id. at 2029, 2031; see also Moore v. United States, 468 A.2d 1331 (D.C. 1983).
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5026 (1982 & Supp. IV 1986) (repealed 1984) [hereinafter FYCA].
62. Moore, 468 A.2d at 1334-35.
63. Id.
64. Wheeler, 115 Daily Wash. L. Rep. at 2031-32.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 2032. The court pointed to several factors in reaching its decision: the Youth
Act's goal of rehabilitation, not simply punishment; youth offenders segregation from hard-
ened adult criminals; less infliction of psychological trauma; and the expungement of records
of conviction. Id
19881
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E. The Castle Doctrine
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently limited the applica-
tion of the "castle doctrine ' 67 in the District of Columbia. In Cooper v.
United States, 61 the defendant shot and killed his brother during a quarrel at
their home. 69 Defendant asserted a claim of self-defense, arguing that his
brother attacked him.70 At trial, the court gave the jury a standard self-
defense instruction, explaining that the defendant could justify use of deadly
force for self-defense purposes only if the circumstances reasonably required
protection against imminent danger of death or serious bodily injury. 7I The
instruction did not impose a duty to retreat, but called a failure to retreat a
factor that the jury may consider "together with all the other circumstances
in determining whether he went further in repelling the danger" 72 than justi-
fied. The defendant objected and requested a castle doctrine instruction to
the effect that "a person has no duty whatsoever to retreat when attacked in
his own home.",
73
The trial court ruled that the castle doctrine applied to a person in his
home attacked by a stranger, but not to altercations between co-occupants of
the abode.74 Therefore, the trial court refused the defendant's request for a
castle doctrine instruction.75 The jury found the defendant guilty of armed
67. The castle doctrine provides an exception to the duty to retreat before using deadly
force to defend oneself. The doctrine applies when the defendant repels an attack in his own
home. See Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 507-08 (1896); Beard v. United States, 158
U.S. 550, 559-63 (1895).
Some states have codified this exception. See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a) (McKin-
ney 1987) ("[E]xcept that he is under no duty to retreat if he is: (i) in his dwelling .... ).
The District of Columbia Code contains no provision concerning the duty to retreat. See
Cooper v. United States, 512 A.2d 1002, 1004-06 (D.C. 1986) (the court reviewed case law to
determine the duty to retreat).
68. 512 A.2d 1002 (D.C. 1986).
69. Id. at 1003.
70. Id.
71. The instruction closely followed the language of a standardized jury instruction.
CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Instruction 5.16B (13th
ed. 1978). The trial judge instructed the jury to determine whether the defendant, considering
his failure to retreat, exceeded the allowable response, under the circumstances, in repelling
the danger. Cooper, 512 A.2d at 1003. The judge explained that a person must attempt to
retreat and avoid the taking of life unless he actually fears imminent danger of death or serious
bodily injury. Id.
72. Cooper, 512 A.2d at 1003. This instruction follows the holding in Gillis v. United
States, 400 A.2d 311 (D.C. 1979). The Gillis court imposed no duty to retreat on the defend-
ant, but allowed the jury to consider whether the defendant could have avoided further con-
frontation by retreating, and therefore have eliminated the need for using deadly force. Id. at
313.
73. Cooper, 512 A.2d at 1004.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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voluntary manslaughter.7 6 The defendant appealed, claiming that the trial
court erred in refusing to give the jury a castle doctrine instruction.7 7
In Cooper, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals addressed, for the
first time, the question of an occupant's duty to retreat when assaulted by a
co-occupant.78 The court examined cases from other jurisdictions and found
that the majority rule allows a castle doctrine instruction when a defendant,
claiming self-defense, is attacked in his home by a co-occupant. 79 The court,
however, adopted the reasoning of a minority of courts that hold the castle
doctrine does not apply in such circumstances, because co-occupants "have
a heightened obligation to treat each other with a degree of tolerance and
respect" and that such individuals must "attempt to defuse the situation."'
The court noted that this rule does not leave victims completely vulnerable
because a person could use deadly force to protect himself when an attempt
to retreat would prove futile."'
II. EVIDENCE
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals clarified the proper use of
convictions for impeachment purposes in Langley v. United States. 2 In
Langley, a trial for assault with intent to commit rape, the defendant
brought a motion in limine to preclude reference to two earlier jury verdicts
finding him guilty of assault and rape.8" The defendant contended that the
prosecution could not utilize the verdicts for impeachment purposes because
sentencing for those crimes had not occurred.84 The trial court ruled that
the prosecution could impeach the defendant's credibility as a witness by
questioning him about the existence of prior convictions, but the prosecution
could not elicit from him the precise nature of the offenses.8 5 As a result of
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 1005. The court addressed only this narrow question, and pointed out that "the
status of the castle doctrine in the District of Columbia has never been squarely decided." Id.
(citing United States v. Peterson, 483 F.2d 1222, 1237 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1007
(1973)).
79. Id. at 1005-06. The court also noted that some jurisdictions follow the American rule
which holds that "one can stand one's ground regardless of where one is assaulted, or by
whom." Id. The castle doctrine would have no bearing in those jurisdictions. Id. Because the
court rejected the application of the American rule for the District of Columbia in Gillis v.
United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979), jurisdictions following that rule could provide
no guidance. Cooper, 512 A.2d at 1005.
80. Cooper, 512 A.2d at 1006.
81. Id. (citing Conner v. State, 361 So. 2d 774, 776 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978)).
82. 515 A.2d 729 (D.C. 1986).
83. Id. at 733.
84. Id at 734.
85. Id.
1988]
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this ruling, the defendant chose not to testify at trial.8 6
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the prosecution
could not use prior guilty verdicts for impeachment purposes until the trial
court had imposed a sentence.8 7 The court concluded that the trial court's
ruling contravened the statutory intent of section 14-305 of the District of
Columbia Code,"8 which defines the permissible scope of impeachment of a
witness with a prior conviction, and thus constituted reversible error.8 9 The
court based its holding upon the traditional view that a conviction does not
become final and appealable until the defendant receives a sentence.9" The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals recognized that several of the federal
circuit courts of appeals had admitted guilty verdicts for impeachment pur-
86. Id. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals declined to apply the rule pronounced
by the Supreme Court in Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (1984). Langley, 515 A.2d at 733.
The Luce Court held that a defendant must testify at trial in order to preserve the issue of
improper impeachment for appeal. 469 U.S. at 43. The court of appeals determined that Luce
would have prospective effect, and because Luce was decided after defendant's trial, its holding
would not apply in the instant case. Langley, 515 A.2d at 733. Therefore, the court declined
to address the applicability of the Luce decision to the defendant's case. Id.
87. Langley, 515 A.2d at 734. Although the District of Columbia courts deemed a "con-
viction" to constitute a final judgment after the rendering of a sentence, they never expressly
addressed the use of a guilty verdict as a conviction for impeachment purposes. Id. at 733-34;
see also McDonald v. United States, 415 A.2d 538, 541 (D.C. 1980) (for purposes of appeal,
defendant's placement on probation after conviction held to be the "functional equivalent" of
sentencing); Thomas v. United States, 121 F.2d 905, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1941) (for impeachment
purposes a conviction is equivalent to a plea or guilty verdict and "in addition, a judgment and
sentence pronounced by the court"); Crawford v. United States, 41 F.2d 979, 980 (D.C. Cir.
1930) (a guilty plea or verdict "must be followed by a judgment and sentence of the court" to
constitute a conviction). In Godfrey v. United States, 454 A.2d 293 (D.C. 1982), the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals held that a prior guilty plea would not constitute a "conviction"
for impeachment purposes but did not discuss the effect of a prior guilty verdict. Id. at 305.
88. Langley, 515 A.2d at 734; see also D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1981). Section 14-305
is analogous to rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Compare FED. R. EVID. 609 (im-
peachment by evidence of conviction of crime) with D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305 (1981) (compe-
tency of witnesses; impeachment by evidence of conviction of crime). The pertinent language
of § 14-305 provides that a witness' credibility may be impeached by introducing a prior crimi-
nal conviction of a witness where the underlying offense "was punishable by death or impris-
onment in excess of one year under the law under which he or she was convicted, or ...
involved dishonesty or false statement (regardless of punishment)." D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-
305(b)(1) (1981).
89. Langley, 515 A.2d at 734-35. The court reasoned that the language of the statute
itself, as well as its historical interpretation by District of Columbia courts, supported the
court's definition of a "conviction" for impeachment purposes. Id. at 734.
90. Id. The court also noted that the statutory language of § 14-305 reinforced this posi-
tion by referring to the effect an appeal from a conviction would have upon the admissibility of
a conviction for impeachment purposes. Id. The court found that § 14-305 implicitly assumed
that the defendant had already received a sentence, because a defendant cannot appeal a con-
viction until that time. Id.
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poses under rule 609 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.9 ' The court ob-
served, however, that significant differences existed between rule 609 and
section 14-305 of the District of Columbia Code.92 Under rule 609, the
court noted, a trial court has the discretion to exclude evidence of a prior
felony conviction if it determines that the prejudicial effect of the evidence
upon the defendant significantly outweighs its probative value for the gov-
ernment. 93 In contrast, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals empha-
sized that section 14-305 is an inclusionary rule that mandates the admission
of all prior felony convictions introduced for impeachment purposes and al-
lows the judge no discretion. 94 The court reasoned that because the judge
could not consider the prejudicial impact of the guilty verdicts, counsel
could not introduce them for impeachment purposes until they were final.95
McAdoo v. United States96 presented a second question regarding the per-
missible scope of impeachment. 97 In McAdoo, the jury convicted the defend-
ant of first-degree murder.98 On appeal, the defendant claimed that the
prosecutor's use of his juvenile record to impeach his only character witness
constituted reversible error.99 The character witness testified at trial that the
defendant's reputation for peacefulness in the community was that of "a
very fine young man.""' On cross-examination, the prosecutor questioned
the witness as to whether he had heard of the defendant's juvenile record for
burglary, armed robbery, and attempted armed robbery.' The witness
stated that he had not heard of these adjudications before.'0 2
Upon review, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals considered, for
the first time, the propriety of using a defendant's juvenile adjudications to
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 734-35. The wording of rule 609(a)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, how-
ever, is not discretionary as the court intimated. Rule 609 requires the trial court to balance
the probative value of the conviction against its prejudicial effect upon the defendant in crimi-
nal cases. FED. R. EvID. 609. The rule only applies to felonies and further requires that the
court determine "that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its prejudicial
effect to the defendant." FED. R. EvID. 609(a)(1). But cf FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2) (convic-
tions involving dishonesty are always admissible).
94. Langley, 515 A.2d at 735.
95. Id.
96. 515 A.2d 412 (D.C. 1986).
97. Id.
98. Id. at 414.
99. Id. The defendant also contended that he did not receive effective assistance of coun-
sel, in violation of his sixth amendment right. Id. at 419. Although the court did find defense
counsel's performance deficient in several respects, it concluded that these transgressions did
not amount to a denial of a fair and reliable trial. Id. at 419-20.
100. Id. at 417.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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impeach the defendant's character witnesses.1 "' The court held such im-
peachment impermissible in the District of Columbia Superior Court."°4
Although the court acknowledged impeachment as the goal behind cross-
examination of a defendant's character witnesses about a defendant's juve-
nile adjudications, 05 the court reasoned that the likelihood of prejudice to
the defendant in admitting juvenile adjudications outweighed the slight pro-
bative value of such adjudications to the credibility of character witnesses. "06
The court noted that local statutes mandate the confidentiality of juvenile
records, 107 increasing the likelihood that a witness would have had little, if
any, opportunity to hear others talk about the defendant's prior record.' 0 8
Although McAdoo flatly forbade the use of a defendant's juvenile adjudi-
cations to impeach the defendant's character witnesses, the subsequent case
of Devore v. United States " weakened the force of this prohibition with its
holding that counsel may question a character witness about the wrongful
acts underlying a juvenile adjudication. "o The court interpreted McAdoo as
signifying that the "traditional assumption" of community awareness of a
defendant's prior convictions did not apply with juvenile adjudications be-
cause of their confidentiality. I"' However, the court recognized the higher
probability of community awareness of the wrongful acts underlying a juve-
nile arrest or adjudication, because the court considered it more likely that
103. Id. at 418. The court noted that other jurisdictions disagree on this issue. Id. To
illustrate this division, the court compared State v. Holzworth, 201 Mont. 54, 56-57, 651 P.2d
1255, 1256 (1982), where the Montana Supreme Court absolutely forbade the prosecution
from referring to juvenile adjudications in cross-examining character witnesses, with Lineback
v. State, 260 Ind. 503, 511, 301 N.E.2d 636, 637 (1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 929 (1974),
where the Indiana Supreme Court permitted such inquiry. McAdoo, 515 A.2d at 418.
104. McAdoo, 515 A.2d at 418. The court noted that generally, a witness may not be
impeached with his own juvenile record because a juvenile adjudication does not carry the
same connotations as the criminal conviction of an adult offender. Id.; see also Smith v. United
States, 392 A.2d 990, 993 (D.C. 1978); cf Tabron v. United States, 410 A.2d 209, 212 (D.C.
1979). Therefore, a juvenile adjudication is not as probative of the reliability of a witness as is
a criminal conviction. McAdoo, 515 A.2d at 418; see also Brown v. United States, 338 F.2d
543, 547 (D.C. Cir. 1964).
105. McAdoo, 515 A.2d at 418.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 418-19. The District of Columbia statute which prescribes the confidentiality of
juvenile case records is § 16-2331. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-2331 (1981); see also id. § 16-
2316(e) (requiring juvenile hearings closed to the general public); id. §§ 16-2316(e), 16-2335
(requiring the sealing of juvenile records).
109. 530 A.2d 1173 (D.C. 1987).
110. Id. at 1175.
111. Id. Writing for the court, Judge Steadman maintained that the court's holding would
not indirectly defeat the purpose of mandating confidentiality for juvenile adjudications be-
cause there are exceptions to this rule, and because the defendant himself elects to put on
character witnesses thereby running the risk of their impeachment. Id. at 1175-76.
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members of the community would have heard of the commission of the acts
themselves." 2 The court, however, emphasized that the trial court must
continue to weigh carefully the probative value and the prejudicial effect of
permitting questions regarding a defendant's juvenile conduct.1 13
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals examined a third claim of
improper impeachment in the case of Brown v. United States. 114 The defend-
ant in Brown appealed her conviction for assault with a deadly weapon on
the grounds that the prosecution improperly impeached her testimony as a
witness at trial with two prior convictions for solicitation of prostitution. 115
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held these convictions admissible
under the provision of section 14-305 of the District of Columbia Code
which allows impeachment of a witness by prior convictions involving "dis-
honesty or false statement."" 6 The court explained that Congress intended
section 14-305 to exclude offenses involving "passion and short temper"
from those properly employed to impeach a witness."' 7 The court stated
that it had previously held convictions for such crimes as attempted lar-
ceny" 18 and narcotics possession' 19 admissible under section 14-30512o and
could find no rational basis to distinguish solicitation of prostitution from
these offenses because none of those offenses involved "passion and short
temper." 1 2 ' Thus, the court added prostitution to its list of crimes involving
"dishonesty or false statement."
112. Id. at 1175. The court concluded that the trial judge had not abused his discretion in
ruling that the prosecutor could question the character witness about the defendant's actions
as a juvenile. Id. at 1176. However, the court vacated one of the two convictions on double
jeopardy grounds. Id. at 1176-77.
113. Id.
114. 518 A.2d 446 (D.C. 1986).
115. Id. at 447.
116. Id. Under § 22-2701 of the District of Columbia Code an offender may not be sen-
tenced to more than ninety days of imprisonment for the solicitation of prostitution. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 22-2701 (1981). Therefore, impeachment was impossible under § 14-
305(b)(l)(A), because it is restricted to offenses punishable by death or imprisonment for more
than one year. D.C. CODE ANN. § 14-305(b)(l)(A) (1981). Consequently, the prosecutor's
only recourse was to attempt impeachment under § 14-305(b)(l)(B), which encompasses any
offense involving dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the possible punishment. Id.
§ 14-305(b)(1)(B); see also supra note 88.
117. Brown, 518 A.2d at 447; see Bates v. United States, 403 A.2d 1159, 1160-62 (D.C.
1979).
118. Baptist v. United States, 466 A.2d 452, 458-59 (D.C. 1983).
119. Durant v. United States, 292 A.2d 157, 161 (D.C. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127
(1973).
120. Brown, 518 A.2d at 446. The court also listed the offenses of attempted housebreak-
ing, Hampton v. United States, 340 A.2d 813, 816-17 (D.C. 1975), and carrying a pistol with-
out a license, Williams v. United States, 337 A.2d 772, 775-76 (D.C. 1975).
121. Brown. 518 A.2d at 447.
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The District of Columbia Court of Appeals scrutinized the sufficiency of a
proffer of bias evidence in Jones v. United States. 122 In Jones, the defendant
intended to illustrate at trial a government witness' bias against the defend-
ant as a result of a previous drug transaction between the two.1 2 3 The de-
fendant intended to elicit testimony from the witness revealing that the
witness had once sold the defendant marijuana for which the defendant
failed to pay.'2 4 At trial, the prosecutor objected when the defense counsel
questioned the government witness as to his involvement with the sale of
marijuana. 125 The defense counsel informed the judge in his proffer that the
defendant and the witness once engaged in a drug transaction with which the
witness had been "dissatisfied."' 26 The judge, however, sustained the
objection. 127
On appeal of his conviction, the defendant argued that the trial court vio-
lated his sixth amendment right of confrontation when the judge limited his
cross-examination of the government's witness. 128 The District of Columbia
Court of Appeals upheld the trial judge's determination that the defense
counsel's proffer did not provide a sufficient basis for the judge to determine
whether or not the proposed line of questioning might elicit testimony pro-
bative of bias.' 29 While the court did not require an exhaustive proffer of
facts, the court found the defense counsel's mere mention of a "dissatisfy-
ing" drug transaction too vague to survive objection.' 3 ° The court thought
the proffer deficient absent an explanation as to how the witness' bias re-
sulted from a drug transaction.' 3 ' The District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals suggested that a sufficient proffer would include specific information as
122. 516 A.2d 513 (D.C. 1986).
123. Id. at 516-17.
124. Id. at 517.
125. Id. at 516. Defense counsel asked the witness, "And it's also a fact that on occasion
you have also sold marijuana, isn't that correct?" Id.
126. Id. In his proffer to the court, defense counsel stated, "Your Honor, the good faith
basis of that question is that Mr. Jones told me that Mr. Jackson has sold him marijuana on
previous occasions and that that is a motive for why he is testifying. It is bias, Your Honor."
Id. The court then questioned defense counsel as to why the transaction would cause the
witness to be biased and counsel replied, "As I understand it, Your Honor, there was some-
thing that at one point in time, there was something wrong with one of the transactions. I
think it was only one transaction. And Mr. Jackson was dissatisfied with it. The way I under-
stand it from Mr. Jones." Id.
127. Id. at 517.
128. Id. at 516.
129. Id. at 517. The court indicated that the trial judge has sound discretion over the
subjects and extent of cross-examination, id. (citing In re C.B.N., 499 A.2d 1215, 1218 (D.C.
1985)), although it conceded that "bias is always a proper subject of cross-examination." Id.
(quoting Springer v. United States, 388 A.2d 846, 855 (D.C. 1978)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
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to what exactly transpired, the parties involved, when the event occurred,
and where it took place.
13 2
Judge Burgess dissented from the majority opinion and maintained that a
sufficient proffer requires only good faith and an illustration of the relevant
bias. 133 In this case, he concluded that the trial judge abused his discretion
in forbidding the defense counsel's line of questioning because it adequately
met these criteria. 134 Judge Burgess criticized the majority's desire for an
explanation of the witness' dissatisfaction with the transaction.1 35 Such a
requirement, he submitted, conflicted with the established standard of good
faith which only prohibits a proffer from being "inherently incredible" and
knowingly false.
136
III. CIVIL LAW AND PROCEDURE
A. Discovery
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals narrowed the scope of discov-
ery in Plough, Inc. v. National Academy of Sciences.137 In Plough, the trial
judge issued a protective order allowing the National Academy of Sciences
(NAS) to withhold from discovery confidential documents.1 38 Plough arose
132. Id. at 518. The court referred to the case of Best v. United States, 328 A.2d 378 (D.C.
1974), as an example where the defense counsel's proffer was sufficient because it met these
criteria. Brown, 516 A.2d at 518. In Best, the prosecutor questioned the relevancy of defense
counsel's cross-examination of the arresting police officer. Best, 328 A.2d at 380. The defense
counsel profferred the following statement:
Your Honor, on the day of the incident this officer struck Mr. Best and put him in
the hospital and he was taken to the hospital that evening. There is evidence of
police brutality and it is admissible to show bias on the part of the police officer....
It's perfectly admissible to show bias.
Id.
133. Jones, 516 A.2d at 523 (Burgess, J., dissenting). Judge Burgess determined that the
proffer adequately met the test for relevance as it need only possess the "potential" to illustrate
bias. Id. at 521 (Burgess, J., dissenting) (quoting Flecher v. United States, 358 A.2d 322, 324
(D.C.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 977 (1976)). He further assumed that defense counsel made the
proffer in good faith. Id. (Burgess, J., dissenting).
134. Id. (Burgess, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 521-22 (Burgess, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Pugh, 436 F.2d 222,
225 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (no factual foundation is required to support a line of questioning on
cross-examination, only a "well reasoned suspicion" that a circumstance might be true); Col-
lins v. United States, 491 A.2d 480, 487 (D.C. 1985) (follows the "well-reasoned suspicion"
standard articulated in United States v. Pugh, 436 F.2d 222, 225 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (regarding
questions as to credibility), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1124 (1986)); Hazel v. United States, 319
A.2d 136, 139 (D.C. 1974) (proper for attorney to present witness on cross-examination with a
hypothetical which was "neither known by counsel to be false, nor inherently incredible").
136. Jones, 516 A.2d at 520 (Burgess, J., dissenting) (quoting Hazel v. United States, 319
A.2d 136, 139 (D.C. 1974)).
137. 530 A.2d 1152 (D.C. 1987).
138. Id. at 1155.
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out of a separate products liability case in which the plaintiff, Bunch, alleged
that the aspirin produced by defendant Plough caused him to develop Reye
Syndrome.1 39 The plaintiff based his claim on NAS studies that linked aspi-
rin to the disease. " During discovery, Plough subpoenaed NAS documents
relating to the study,' 4 ' which included preliminary reports and documents
containing confidential deliberations from closed NAS committee meet-
ings.1"' When the NAS refused to comply with Plough's discovery request,
Plough moved to compel discovery. 143
The trial judge initially denied NAS's motion for a protective order and
directed the NAS to produce the documents, concluding that Plough's right
to view the documents outweighed NAS's right to confidentiality.' 44 How-
ever, the judge entered a superseding order granting the NAS's motion for a
protective order in light of a letter received from the plaintiff that he would
not introduce the report into evidence at trial.145  The letter weakened
Plough's argument that the documents were necessary and thus, the trial
court concluded that the NAS's interest in confidentiality outweighed
Plough's need for the documents. 1
46
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the
trial judge denying the plaintiff's request to view the documents. 4 7 First,
the court stated that the party seeking to withhold materials on the basis of
confidentiality has the burden of demonstrating the harm involved in the
139. Id. at 1154.
140. Id. The United States Department of Health and Human Services together with a
private contractor conducted a Pilot Study that linked aspirin to Reye Syndrome. Id. The
National Academy of Sciences (NAS), a nonprofit organization, was retained to critique the
Pilot Study. Id. NAS issued several reports approving of the study methodology, agreeing
with its conclusions, and recommending the release of the study to the public. Id. The New
England Journal of Medicine subsequently published the Pilot Study. Public Health Service
Study on Reye Syndrome and Medications, Report of the Pilot Phase, 313 NEW ENG. J. MED.
849 (1985).
141. 530 A.2d at 1154.
142. Plough requested documents that the court listed in three categories: those outlining
the committee's confidential discussions concerning the methodology of the Pilot Study; early
drafts of the committee's reports; and documents pertaining to the NAS's confidential internal
review of the reports. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1155.
145. Id. Concerning the letter the court said, "[tihis letter stated that counsel had read five
NAS reports and had 'no intention of relying on these reports at trial for any purpose.' " Id.
Plough argued that even if the court did not admit the reports into evidence at trial, the reports
had received a great deal of publicity and the plaintiff's experts would inevitably refer to the
reports. Id. at 1159. Therefore, to rebut the validity of the NAS reports, Plough argued the
necessity of the documents. Id.
146. Id. at 1155.
147. Id. at 1160-61.
[Vol. 37:677
Developments in D.C Case Law
disclosure.'4 8 If the party seeking to withhold meets its burden, the other
party must then establish the relevance and necessity of the disclosure.'4 9 If
both sides meet their burdens, the trial judge balances the parties' inter-
ests.I1° The court then concluded that no real necessity existed and that the
NAS's need for confidentiality outweighed Plough's need for the
documents. 15
The court agreed with the NAS that, "[c]riticism would be less than frank
if subject to disclosure" to outside parties, even if the court limited the dis-
closure through a protective order.'" 2 Plough argued the necessity of ob-
taining the deliberative documents in order to rebut the NAS evaluation of
the Pilot Report, the government report linking aspirin to Reye Syn-
drome. 3' While the court conceded the relevance of the documents, it dis-
puted Plough's claim of necessity, 154 particularly because Plough had
obtained access to the raw data. 5 The court recognized this information,
together with expert testimony, as sufficient to rebut the validity of the Pilot
Report. 1
56
The court presented two reasons for supporting the nondisclosure of insti-
tutional review panel deliberations.' 57 First, the court reasoned that disclo-
sure would have a "chilling" effect on the deliberative process.'5 8 Further,
the court recognized a principle that extends a "qualified privilege" to insti-
148. Id. at 1155 (citing Centurian Indus. v. Warren Steurer & Assoc., 665 F.2d 323, 325
(10th Cir. 1981); C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2043, at
301 (1970)).
149. Id. (citing Centurian Indus. v. Warren Steurer & Assoc., 655 F.2d 323, 325 (10th Cir.
1981); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Coca-Cola Co., 107 F.R.D. 288, 292 (D. Del. 1985)).
150. Id. at 1156 (citing C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 2043, at 301-02 (1970)).
151. Id. at 1160.
152. Id. at 1158.
153. Id. at 1160. The United States Department of Health and Human Services and Wes-
tat, Inc. conducted the pilot study to determine the relationship between aspirin and Reye
Syndrome. Id. The result of the study indicated a "strong association" between aspirin and
Reye Syndrome. Id.
154. Id. at 1159-60. The court stated that "Plough is, at bottom, grounding its claim of the
necessity of these documents on its desire to rebut NAS's prestige." Id. at 1160.
155. Id. The Court stated that because Plough had access to the raw material, he was not
faced with the risk of "being presented at trial with a study which it cannot challenge for lack
of data," but concerned with "rebutting an evaluation of a scientific study." Id. at 1159.
156. Id. at 1159-60.
157. Id. at 1157-58.
158. Id. at 1157. The court cited Dow Chemical Co. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262 (7th Cir.
1982), in which the judge refused to enforce the subpoena, concluding that doing so would
have a chilling effect by leaving researchers "with the knowledge throughout continuation of
their studies that the fruits of their labors had been appropriated by and were being scrutinized
by a not-unbiased third party whose interests were arguably antithetical to theirs." Id. at
1276.
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tutional review panels.' 59 This privilege acts to shield internal panels from
inquisitive outsiders.'" The court concluded that the interest in "unim-
peded criticism and self-analysis supporting confidentiality of the delibera-
tions of the NAS review panels" outweighed Plough's interest in obtaining
the documents. 
16
'
B. The District of Columbia: A Stateless Entity Not Subject to Diversity
Jurisdiction
In Long v. District of Columbia 162 the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit rendered it impossible for parties in a diver-
sity case to sue the District of Columbia in federal court. 63 The plaintiff
filed suit against the District of Columbia and the Potomac Electric Power
Company (PEPCO), 6' after an accident at a district intersection resulted in
the death of her husband. 165 The accident occurred at an intersection with
nonoperational traffic signals. 166 The jury returned a verdict in favor of the
plaintiff against both the District and PEPCO.16 7
On appeal, the District contended that the lower court lacked subject mat-
ter jurisdiction. 168 The court of appeals first considered whether a party
could sue the District in diversity. The court answered in the negative be-
cause while the diversity statute 69 requires that the matter in controversy
involve "citizens of different states," the District does not have the charac-
teristics of a citizen of a state under the diversity statute.' 70 The court noted
that the Supreme Court has held that the diversity statute "impliedly re-
159. Plough, 530 A.2d at 1158. The court noted that the concept of a "qualified privilege"
has been extended to hospital staff committees that review clinical work performed at the
hospital. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1158-60. The court went on to state that "[tihe review process is a critical
element in the publication of an Academy report, guaranteeing that each report is technically
sound and that it creditably represents the institution." Id. at 1158.
162. 820 F.2d 409 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
163. Id. at 414.
164. Id. at 410.
165. Id. at 411-12.
166. Id. at 411.
167. Id. at 412.
168. Id. at 412-17. PEPCO, on the other hand, argued that substantive tort law principles
entitled it to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Id. at 417. The power company argued
that it owed no duty to the public to maintain traffic signals in accordance with its contract
with the District. Id. In the alternative, PEPCO argued that even if it owed a duty to motor-
ists, no PEPCO employee breached that duty. Id.
169. Id. at 412 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982)).
170. Id. at 416. The court stated that "the District is indeed a "stateless" entity. Id.
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jected the exercise of jurisdiction over the particular nonfederal claim."''
The court stated that the District's status as a "stateless entity" compelled a
finding that the District was neither subject to diversity jurisdiction nor pen-
dent party jurisdiction in a case based on diversity jurisdiction.' 72
C. Tort Liability for Suicide
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals recently established the stan-
dard for deciding when a plaintiff may recover damages for the suicide of
another. 7 3 In District of Columbia v. Peters,174 the decedent, Peters, as-
saulted a police officer, prompting the officer to shoot him.' 75 The gunshot
wound paralyzed Peters from the chest down. 17 6 Consequently, Peters and
his wife filed suit against the officer alleging use of excessive force and
against the District for failing to provide the police with adequate train-
ing. 7 7 After the filing of the complaint the husband committed suicide.'
78
The wife amended her complaint to include a wrongful death and survival
action.' 79 The jury awarded the plaintiff a verdict of $400,000. 8
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals reversed the jury's award of
damages for the wrongful death action and remanded the case to the trial
court to determine damages for the survival action.' 8 ' The court held that
as a general rule "one may not recover damages in negligence for the suicide
of another."' 82 The court considered suicide an intervening act that came
between the alleged negligence and the wrongful death.'8 3
Significantly, the court in Peters adopted an exception to the general rule
171. Id. at 415 (citing Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365 (1978)).
172. Id. at 416. The court stated that, "The diversity statute, by speaking directly to the
kinds of parties who can use it to enter federal court, impliedly prohibits courts from exercis-
ing pendent party jurisdiction to hear claims against persons or entities falling outside of the
statute's scope in suits based on diversity." Id.
173. District of Columbia v. Peters, 527 A.2d 1269 (D.C. 1987).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 1271.
176. Id.
177. Id. More specifically, the plaintiff claimed that the police did not have sufficient train-
ing to handle suspects who are mentally disturbed or act in a drug-induced state. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. The jury awarded the wife a lump sum of $349,000 for her survival and wrongful
death claims and $51,000 for her loss of consortium. Id. at 1272.
181. Id. at 1277. The court affirmed the $51,000 jury verdict for loss of consortium, but
vacated the remainder of the jury's award because the jury did not separate the damages for
the wrongful death and survival actions. Id.
182. Id. at 1275. The court went on to say that the "act of suicide generally is considered
to be a deliberate, intentional, and intervening act which precludes a finding that a given de-
fendant is, in fact, responsible for the decedent's death." Id.
183. Id.
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concerning tort liability for suicides. 184 The court established the principle
that in order to recover damages in tort for the suicide of another, plaintiff
must show that the defendant's action caused the victim to have an "irresis-
tible impulse" to commit suicide.'8 5 The court noted that several courts and
the Restatement (Second) of Torts have adopted the "irresistible impulse"
test. '1 6
The court found sufficient evidence present to show that Peters had a
mental condition. However, expert testimony did not indicate that the
shooting caused Peters to have an uncontrollable impulse to commit sui-
cide. 187 Thus, the court found no irresistible impulse and, therefore, no basis
for awarding damages on the wrongful death claim.'
88
D. Tavern Owner Liability
In Rong Yao Zhou v. Jennifer Mall Restaurant, 1 9 the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals faced a case of first impression 9 ° concerning the liabil-
ity of tavern owners whose intoxicated patrons subsequently cause injuries to
third parties. 9 ' This decision significantly broadened the potential scope of
liability of tavern owners.
Plaintiffs suffered serious injuries in an automobile accident caused by the
defendant who was intoxicated at the time of the accident.' 92 In their suit
seeking $3.5 million in damages from the Jennifer Mall Restaurant, 19 3 the
plaintiffs claimed that the restaurant violated the Beverage Control Act by
184. Id. The court called the newly-adopted rule the "Restatement exception":
If the actor's negligent conduct so brings about the delirium or insanity of another as
to make the actor liable for it, the actor is also liable for harm done by the other to
himself while delirious or insane, if his delirium or insanity ... makes it impossible
for him to resist an impulse caused by his insanity which deprives him of his capacity
to govern his conduct in accordance with reason.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 (1977).
185. Peters, 527 A.2d at 1276.
186. See McLoughlin v. Sullivan, 123 N.H. 335, 338, 461 A.2d 123, 124 (1983); Fuller v.
Preis, 35 N.Y.2d 425, 429, 322 N.E.2d 263, 265, 363 N.Y.S.2d 568, 572 (1974); Baxter v.
Safeway Stores Inc., 13 Wash. App. 229, 232-33, 534 P.2d 585, 588 (1975); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 455 (1977).
187. Peters, 527 A.2d at 1276-77. The court noted that the psychiatrist who examined
Peters testified that the shooting was a "powerful contributor" to Peters' sense of helplessness
and put into motion the events that eventually led to the suicide. Id. at 1277. Nevertheless,
the court stated that the testimony is "a far cry" from establishing that the decedent felt an
"irresistible impulse" to commit suicide. Id.
188. Id. at 1277.
189, 534 A.2d 1268 (D.C. 1987).
190. Id. at 1269.
191. Id.
192. Id. at 1269-70.
193. Id. at 1270.
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serving alcoholic beverages to the defendant while he was, or appeared to be,
intoxicated.1 94 At trial, the District of Columbia Superior Court granted the
defendant's motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint failed to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.195
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the restaurant
owner's violation of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act rendered the tavern
owner negligent per se' 96 and potentially liable for injuries proximately
caused to the public.' 97 The court maintained that an individual who vio-
lates an ordinance intended to protect public safety faces liability for negli-
gence.' 98 Finding that the Alcohol Beverage Control Act had a public
safety purpose, 199 the court recognized Congress' aim to regulate alcohol, in
order to prevent the hazards associated with its abuse,2" including the oper-
ation of mechanical devices, such as automobiles.2 ' The court noted that
the violation of state statutes prohibiting the sale of alcohol to intoxicated
persons often form the "basis upon which courts have found breach of the
duty of care that is necessary for imposing tort liability on tavern keepers for
resulting injuries."202 The court concluded that the violation by the
restauranteur constituted negligence per se and, thus, found the restaurant
owner liable for damages.2 °3
IV. LANDLORD-TENANT LAW
Three issues concerning notices to quit presented the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals with cases of first impression. In a decision concerning
194. Id. at 1271-72. The Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 25-101 to -
139 (1981), prohibits tavern owners from "permit[ting] on the licensed premises ... the con-
sumption of any beverage by any intoxicated person, or any person of notoriously intemperate
habits, or any person who appears to be intoxicated .... Rong Yao Zhou, 534 A.2d at 1271.
195. Rang Yao Zhou, 534 A.2d at 1270.
196. Id. at 1276.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 1273 (citing Ross v. Hartman, 139 F.2d 14, 15 (D.C. Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 790 (1944)). The court stated that, "[o]ur courts have recognized that a variety of
statutes have a public safety purpose justifying the application of the rule that their violation
constitutes negligence." Id. at 1274.
199. Id. at 1275. In reviewing the legislative history of the Alcohol Beverage Control Act,
the court stated that, "Congress in 1934 clearly was aware of the public safety hazards associ-
ated with alcohol abuse and incorporated safety concerns as an integral part of its comprehen-
sive scheme to regulate the sale and use of alcohol in the nation's capital." Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 1276; see also Klingerman v. SOL Corp., 505 A.2d 474, 478 (Me. 1986); Ram-
sey v. Anctil, 106 N.H. 375, 211 A.2d 900, 901 (1965); Rappaport v. Nichols, 31 N.J. 188, 200-
05, 156 A.2d. 1, 8-9 (1959).
203. Rang Yao Zhou, 534 A.2d at 1277.
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notices to vacate a residential leasehold, the court construed a 1984 amend-
ment2°4 to the Rental Housing Act of 1980205 requiring the landlord to per-
sonally serve the tenant with notice to quit.2 °6 Graham v. Bernstein20 7
resulted from the opposition of a group of tenants to a proposed rent in-
crease for apartments in a building subject to rent control.208 When the
District of Columbia Rental Accommodations Office denied the landlord's
petition, the landlord decided to remove the building from the rental mar-
ket.2 ' The landlord then notified each of the tenants by first class mail that
he or she must vacate the premises within 180 days. Relying on section 45-
1595 of the District of Columbia Code, pertaining to service of "any infor-
mation or document,"2 0 the landlord attempted no other method of
211service.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals applied section 45-1406 of the
District of Columbia Code,212 which specifically addressed the process for
serving a notice to vacate. The court reasoned that when a general statutory
provision varies from a specific enactment, the specific provision controls.21 3
Further, the court found that the legislative purpose of rent control provi-
sions supported the more stringent notice requirement.21 4 Consequently, the
court held that service of a notice to vacate by mail is inadequate.21 5
204. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1406 (1986).
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. 527 A.2d 736 (D.C. 1987).
208. Id. at 736. The court noted the friction existing between the tenants and landlords
that began in 1980 when the landlords filed a hardship petition to increase rents with the
District Rental Accommodations Office. Id.
209. Id.
210. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1595 (1981) (replaced by D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-2594 (1986).
Section 45-1595 allows for service "[b]y mail, or deposit with the United States Postal Service
properly stamped and addressed." Id.
211. Graham, 527 A.2d at 737.
212. The court noted that Congress enacted § 45-1406 in 1901 and amended it only once,
in 1984, to add the words "English and Spanish" after the words "shall be served." Id. The
statute now reads: "Every notice to the tenant to quit shall be served in English and Spanish
upon him personally .. " D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1406 (1986).
213. Graham, 527 A.2d at 739.
214. Id. at 738. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted in Wolf v. District of
Columbia Rental Accommodations Comm'n, 414 A.2d 878 (D.C. 1980), that "[t]he primary
legislative purpose in promulgating rent controls was to alleviate the exploitation of tenants
that resulted from the tight housing market in the District." Id. at 880.
215. Graham, 527 A.2d at 739. This result concurs with the court's earlier ruling in Jones
v. Brawner Co., 435 A.2d 54 (D.C. 1981), which invalidated service of notice to vacate by
slipping the notice under the door of an apartment. Id. at 56. The Jones decision foreshad-
owed the Supreme Court's decision in Greene v. Lindsey, 456 U.S. 444 (1982), that service of
process by posting on the door of the tenant's apartment does not satisfy federal due process
requirements. Id. at 454.
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The court construed another provision of section 45-1406 of the District
of Columbia Code in Ontell v. Capitol Hill E. W. Limited Partnership.2 1 6 A
commercial tenant, who leased office space in a mixed use building, re-
mained in possession as a month-to-month tenant after his lease expired.2 17
Although the building management served a thirty day notice to vacate, the
tenant remained in possession, alleging defective service of process under
section 45-1406 because the notice did not include a Spanish translation."'
Section 45-1406 requires that landlords provide both Spanish and English
versions of such notices.21 9 The tenant admittedly neither read nor under-
stood Spanish. 2 °
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals conceded that the statute ap-
plied to both residential and commercial leases22 1 and recognized the general
judicial policy to invalidate a notice to quit in the event of defective service.
However, the court refused to extend this policy's protection to a commer-
cial tenant who alleges no prejudice from the defect.222 Resorting again to
the legislative history of the statute, the court found that the purpose under-
lying the bilingual requirement reflected a due process concern for the hous-
ing rights of Spanish-speaking residents.2 23 Thus, the court refused to
invalidate defective notice in a commercial setting absent some showing of
prejudice.
In Burns v. Harvey, 2 4 the court held that a tenant's oral notice of intent to
quit a rental unit did not constitute a waiver of the statutory requirement of
a written notice to quit, nor entitle the landlord to possession.2 25 In Burns,
the tenants orally informed their landlord they would vacate their apartment
one month before expiration of the lease.2 2 6 The tenants later decided to
216. 527 A.2d 1292 (D.C. 1987).
217. Id. at 1293. The defendant joined a tenants' association in an effort to purchase the
building from his original landlord. Id. at 1294. Shortly after purchasing the building, the
association informed the defendant that as a commercial tenant, his continued membership
was at the discretion of the association's members. Id. The members of the association later
voted not to continue his membership. Id.
218. Id.
219. D.C. CODE ANN. § 45-1406 (1986).
220. Ontell, 527 A.2d at 1296. The court concluded that because the defendant read and
understood English, he could not dispute that his actual notice had sufficiently satisfied the
statute. Id.
221. Id. at 1294.
222. Id. at 1295.
223. Id. (citing Committee on Consumer Regulatory Affairs, Testimony Before the District
of Columbia City Council in Support of Proposed Bill 5-134 passim (Apr. 12, 1983)).
224. 524 A.2d 35 (D.C. 1987).
225. Id. at 38.
226. Id. at 36.
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remain in the apartment. 2 7 The landlord, however, rented the apartment in
the interim and brought suit for possession.228 Because none of the commu-
nications between the parties satisfied the written format mandated by sec-
tions 45-1402 to -1404 of the District of Columbia Code, 229 the court found
that the tenants did not waive their right to a written notice to quit nor did
they give their landlord notice effective to permit the landlord to recover
possession. 230 After examining the situation in light of the overall statutory
scheme and the problems inherent in oral notices, the court found the land-
lord not entitled to possession.231
Duncan v. G.E. W, Inc. 232 involved a series of commercial leases for four-
teen Little Tavern hamburger shops in and around the Washington area.233
The three year leases provided the tenant with two consecutive renewal op-
tions and the option to purchase each shop.234 The leases allowed the tenant
to exercise the options by giving the landlord three months' written no-
tice.235 G.E.W., the chain tenant, obtained a $400,000 loan which it spent
fully on improvements to the restaurants.236 The landlord knew of the loan
and improvements, and the tenant orally informed the landlord that it would
renew the options. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals underscored
the close contact between the parties by noting that the landlord also shared
office space with the tenant.237 However, ambiguous language in the lease238
led to a misunderstanding as to when the option deadline would fall. The
227. Id. at 37.
228. Id. The landlord also sought double rent for the period the tenants occupied the
apartment after the oral notice period expired. Id. at 37.
229. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 45-1402 to -1405 (1986). Each of the statutes, relating to peri-
odic tenancies, tenancies at will, and tenancies by sufferance, require thirty days' written notice
for a notice to quit to be valid. Id.
230. Burns, 524 A.2d at 39. Each of these provisions specifically requires that any such
notices must be "in writing," and these provisions make no reference to oral notification. D.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 45-1402 to -1405 (1986).
231. Burns, 524 A.2d at 39.
232. 526 A.2d 1358 (D.C. 1987).
233. Id. at 1359.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1360.
237. Id.
238. Id. Article 18 of each lease contained the following language: "These options shall be
exercised by written notice given to lessor or delivered or mailed to lessor, at the address at
which the rent is then payable, at least three (3) months before the expiration of the initial term
hereof or first renewal term hereof." Id.
The tenant "concluded that the use of the plural 'these options,' followed by the disjunctive
'or,' meant that the remainder of the sentence did not require three months' advanced notice
unless [the tenant] wished to exercise both options before the end of the initial term." Id. at
1361. A linguistics expert testified that the tenant's interpretation of the language was reason-
able. Id. at 1361.
[Vol. 37:677
Developments in D.C. Case Law
tenant consequently did not deliver a written notice renewing the options
until twenty-three days after the actual deadline.239
At trial, the Superior Court found G.E.W. made an "honest mistake" and
allowed renewal of the options as a matter of equity.2" The District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals affirmed, giving weight to the landlord's knowledge
of the substantial amounts expended on improvements in the restaurants and
inconsequential length of the delay.241 The court also noted that the land-
lord consented to the assignment of the leases as collateral for the loan and
that the landlord did not rely to his detriment on the failure to give timely
notice.242 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals noted that although
generally the court will strictly enforce property options according to their
terms, a judgment for the landlord in this case would signify a "regression to
the days when hypertechnical legal arguments were relied upon to prevent
fair and just results." '243
An earlier ruling in the Small Claims Branch of the Superior Court
24
remains especially significant because it is the first instance of a District of
Columbia court awarding punitive damages in a landlord-tenant dispute.245
Although decided in the context of a tenant's action for recovery of moneys
tendered to a landlord in the Small Claims Branch of the Superior Court,
Gyebi v. Friedman,246 potentially affords tenants a potent weapon against
landlords who willfully rent property on which known, egregious housing
code violations exist. The unreported 1985 case remains noteworthy because
it represents the first instance in which a District of Columbia court awarded
punitive damages in a landlord-tenant dispute.
In Gyebi, the small claims judge awarded the tenant $475 in actual dam-
ages and $1,000 in punitive damages due to the landlord's "wanton, willful,
fraudulent and malicious conduct., 24
7
Despite the existence of more than eighty housing code violations, most of
which were not evident during the tenant's initial inspection due to poor
lighting conditions,248 the landlord accepted $275 as a security deposit and
239. Id. at 1359.
240. Id. at 1362.
241. Id. at 1364.
242. Id. at 1364-65. At trial, the defendants testified they "took no action whatsoever in
reliance upon the delay." Id. at 1362.
243. Id. at 1365.
244. Gyebi v. Friedman, C.A. No. SC-4594-85, slip op. (D.C. Super. Ct. Small Claims
Branch, May 14, 1985) (Memorandum Opinion and Order).
245. Id. at 5.
246. C.A. No. SC-4594-85, slip op. (D.C. Super. Ct. Small Claims Branch, May 14, 1985)
(Memorandum Opinion and Order).
247. Id. at 7.
248. Id at 1-2.
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an additional $200 for the first month's rent from the tenant.24 9 Upon later
visiting the apartment in preparation for her move, the tenant realized its
uninhabitable condition.250 Despite numerous telephone calls from the ten-
ant, the landlord failed to make any of the necessary repairs.251
The defective condition of the premises for which she had paid $475 pre-
vented her from moving into that apartment. Because she was an expectant
mother subsisting on welfare assistance, the tenant was financially unable to
secure another apartment.252 She was, therefore, "relegated to remain in her
one room apartment.., with her two young children and newborn baby."'2 53
Consequently, the tenant brought an action in the Small Claims Branch to
recover the $475 as well as punitive damages.
Although confronted with a simple breach of contract claim, the judge
began by noting that rules of District of Columbia landlord-tenant proce-
dure governing assertion of defenses in suits for possession initiated by the
landlord did not provide for the award of punitive damages.254 However,
the court acknowledged that it may order punitive damages in breach of
contract cases where the "acts of the breaching party are malicious, wanton,
oppressive, or with criminal indifference to civil obligations... [and] merge
with and assume the character of a willful tort. ' 2 5 Strongly indicating that
this logic may apply with equal force in the context of a landlord's suit for
possession, the court cited with approval New York and Vermont opinions
allowing recovery of punitive damages in landlord-tenant cases.256
While defenses to a landlord's action for possession are significantly cir-
cumscribed by District of Columbia rules of landlord-tenant procedure, 257
Gyebi suggests that punitive damages may be awarded to tenants in cases of
249. Id. at 2. The tenant noticed broken windows and problems with the bathroom sink.
The landlord agreed to allow the tenant to apply the $50 balance owing for the first month's
rent toward these repairs. Id.
250. Id. at 2-3.
251. Id. at 3.
252. Id. at 3-4.
253. Id. at 4.
254. Id. at 5.
255. Id. (citing Den v. Den, 222 A.2d 647, 648 (D.C. 1966)).
256. See, e.g., Davis v. Williams, 92 Misc. 2d 1051, 402 N.Y.S.2d 92 (Civ. Ct. 1977); Hilder
v. St. Peter, 144 Vt. 150, 478 A.2d 202 (1984).
257. See D.C. SUPER. CT. LANDLORD-TENANT BRANCH R. 5(b). See generally Comment,
Defensively Pleading Commercial Landlords' Breaches In Summary Actions for Possession in
the District of Columbia: A Retrospective and Proposal, 37 CATH. U.L. REV. 705 (1988) (dis-
cussing limitations on tenants' ability to assert defenses based on landlords' breach of cove-
nants imposed by the District of Columbia landlord-tenant rules of procedure).
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a landlord's egregious disregard for the health and safety of his tenants."'
John C. Kalavritinos, Jr.
Kevin W Lynch
Carla Marcolin
Brian Yoklavich
258. Gyebi, C.A. No. SC-4594-85, slip op. at 7 (D.C. Super. Ct. Small Claims Branch, May
15, 1985) (mem.).
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